Episode 2

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Published on:

23rd Sep 2023

Why Japan succeeded post WW2

In this podcast, I look at a paper by Professor H. Wade titled "Escaping the Periphery".

Few non-western countries have reached the general prosperity of Western Europe and North America in the past two centuries ...The clearest exceptions are ... Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea ... How did they do it?

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Transcript
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And now I wanted to go final topic and I wasn't sure if I was gonna get to this,

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but looks like again, so this is to do with Japan and I found this article

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which was by a guy called robert H.

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Wade.

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He is a professor of global political economy at the London School of Economics.

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The New Zealand citizen worked at the instituted development

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studies at Sussex University.

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He worked at the World Bank, he worked at the US Congress.

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He was a Prince University and at MIT and around university.

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So he's got some credentials in in economics and political economy.

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So this is looking at Japan in particular, and Taiwan and Korea.

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And why did those countries end up becoming developed, prosperous first world

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countries when other countries did not?

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Of course the General IMF World Bank policy is with, say, developing

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countries and let's just typically think South America is, they would

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say to them, you guys are in trouble.

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We gave you a loan, you haven't repaid it.

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What you've gotta do is sell off your public infrastructure

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to multinational corporations.

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You've gotta let them come in and buy all of your good stuff and you can then

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use that money to pay off your debt.

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You have to reduce your social services.

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And you you know, you cannot put in any sort of trade barriers.

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So you might want to start a manufacturing sector, but you can't

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put in a trade barrier to protect that industry in its infancy while

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it's trying to get up and running.

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So that makes it impossible for these countries to develop industrial

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industries of manufacturing or high tech because you can't just go from zero to

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competing against the existing players.

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You need some protection.

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And the World Bank and the IMF just don't allow these countries to do it.

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They ban them from protecting these industries, and that's the

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secret to developing an industry.

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And so anyway, the question is, How did Japan, Taiwan, South Korea end up and

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to some extent also Singapore Hong Kong, how did these countries break through and

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and actually manage to become successful?

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Cheap, wasn't it at the time?

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So, Well, it's a combination of things, Joan, but the, the narrative that would

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like they'd like to tell you is that it was liberal minded, free enterprise

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that allowed these countries to succeed.

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Cheap labor, didn't spend much relied on cheap labor and

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therefore undercut everybody.

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To build up an industry is, is kind of, you know, one story for example,

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but that's not what happened, . So in this article, and again, it'll be

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in the show notes for the patrons.

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How did they do it?

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So I've highlighted bits from this article, which is gonna

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take me 10 or 15 minutes to go through and paint this picture.

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So abstract.

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Few non-western countries have reached the general prosperity of

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Western Europe and North America.

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Just about all of the countries which were in the periphery in

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1960, remain in the periphery today.

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The clearest exceptions are in capitalist Northeast Asia, namely

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Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea.

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And you could add Singapore and Hong Kong to that.

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So how did they escape the periphery?

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How did they do it?

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And he says here, the Northeast Asian countries remain among a still smaller

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set of non-Western countries, which have developed mostly indigenously

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owned firms across a broad range of Mabel, major global industries.

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They're able to act as first tier suppliers to Western multinationals.

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So in these countries, they're locally owned and operated

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and they're able to compete.

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And the types of industries that they're in includes chemicals, petrochemicals,

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electronics, steel ship building, cars, car parts, and more recently, biotech,

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advanced semiconductors, nanotechnology, and even space exploration.

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So these countries are located some 9,000 kilometers across the Pacific

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from the world's biggest and most innovative market, mainly the usa.

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While next door to the usa, Mexico has languished, nowhere near

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achieving what these countries did.

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It did.

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So how exceptional is the economic performance?

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How many non-Western countries have reached the general level of

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prosperity of Western Europe and North America in the past two centuries?

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And in this article, he says, fewer than 10 countries have managed to do it.

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And there was a World Bank study in 2013 that confirmed this conclusion.

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It identified 101 countries in 1960 as middle income, and found

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that of those only 13 reached high income almost five decades later.

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So 101 countries only 13 managed to do it.

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And there's a table there, which shows the average income of countries in 1970 as a

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percentage of US average income, and then it shows their average income in 2010.

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So 40 years later, again, as a percentage of.

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US income.

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So take for example, Taiwan.

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In 1970, the average income in Taiwan was 20% of US average income.

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And 40 years later, 40 years later, Taiwanese reached the point where the

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average income is 80% of the US income.

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So it's an amazing performance.

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Japan was 50%, now it's 70%.

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South Korea was 10% in 1970 10% of the American wage, average wage.

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And then 40 years later, the average South Korean was 70% of the average American.

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Whereas you look at countries like India, it was 5%, and now it's only 10%.

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Brazil was 15, now only 30.

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So that's the sort of.

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Progress that they're talking about.

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And this article says that there's seeing to be some sort of glass

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ceiling or some trap that stops countries progressing through.

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And the next section discusses the causes proposed by analysts writing in mainstream

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economics, often called neoliberalism.

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So by the 1980s when Northeast Asia's rise began to attract attention,

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most economists viewed their subject through the lens of neoliberalism.

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So they looked at these successful countries, most economists, and

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said, oh, that's the free market working in these countries.

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So neo-liberal philosophy says that the market is the best

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institution for growth and liberty.

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Even where there are market failures, you're best just leaving

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things untreated because the cost of correcting them through state

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intervention is is dangerous.

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And they look for a maximum degree of openness to the international economy.

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And maximum integration.

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And the idea that governments would curb competition in the interest of helping

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some firms and industries while they're sort of, getting themselves organized.

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That's not part of the formula.

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So the World Banks 1993 book called the East Asian Miracle proves this thinking.

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It examined the causes of success in eight high performing Asian

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economies, and the book argues that openness to international trade.

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Based on largely neutral incentives was the critical factor in their growth.

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Basically saying cuz they were open to trade, that's why they succeeded.

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And and this sort of confirmed the whole Adam Smith neoliberal argument

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and and, and basically the world bank promoting market liberalization pointing

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to these countries as success stories.

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But according to this paper, the writer says that's not the case.

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And it's a far more interesting answer than that.

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And it turns out that the answer is closely related to geopolitics of

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Northeast Asia and the United States.

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Beginning in the late 19th century there were three orders in East Asia.

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So we had Japan.

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With its basically Japan colonized career in Taiwan.

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And the Japanese colonial government treated career in Taiwan as offshore

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farms, mines and industries, and they were closely integrated.

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So by 1940, somewhere between 50 and 70% of Korean and Taiwanese

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children were in elementary school.

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And all three countries were more homogenous in terms of ethnicity and

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religion than most other countries.

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So that's interesting.

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For starters that Japan colonized Korea and Taiwan and basically

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Japanese, them and their cultures became very close and education was

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a big part of what was going on.

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Second area was Hong Kong and Southeast Asia, so we had the

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colonialists transformed the economy except for Hong Kong into commodity

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production for western markets.

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So thinking sort of Indonesia for example, we had the Dutch had colonized

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Indonesia and basically market Yes.

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And plantations, rubber, rubber, stuff like that.

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Big landlords an emphasis on single crops and, and a Landon class.

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So in those sorts of countries colonial governments was more passive.

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So the Dutch were passive in the sense of accepting the incumbent landed elites

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and allowing them to just do what they wanted to do provided the plantations

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were operating so, In those countries.

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By 1940 only about 2% of children were in elementary school, in the

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French colony of Vietnam, for example.

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So whereas Japan, when it colonized career in Taiwan, had 50 to 70%

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of children in elementary school, France, when had colonized.

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Vietnam only had about 2% of children in elementary school.

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And then the third area, so we had Japan with Korea and Taiwan.

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That's one area.

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We had these sort of colonies with plantations.

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That was the second area.

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And then China, different case altogether.

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, so turning back to Japan, Japan was forced in the mid 19th century

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to do stuff for some 250 years before the mid 19th century.

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Japanese rulers.

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Isolated the country.

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And then in 1853, Commodor Perry of the US Navy sailed into Edo,

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which is now Tokyo harbor with a fleet of warships and demanded that

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Japan open up to American commerce.

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Nothing's changed.

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1853.

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Nearly 200 years later, they're still doing it sailed.

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He learned it from the British.

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Come on.

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Yeah.

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Sailed in and said except the Americans didn't wanna occupy,

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they just wanted companies to operate and just wanted free trade.

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Yeah.

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So he sailed into the harbor in 1853 and demanded that the Japanese

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open up their economy, so his visits send shockwaves through the Japanese

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country's leaders who fear that America might take Japan as a colony.

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Because they had just watched.

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What had happened to China and thought, well, don't want that

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happening to us, are we next?

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So the Japanese government responded with wholesale reforms to create a

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centralized state and national identity as the basis for a strong military.

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And they had this thing which was, if we take the initiative, we can dominate.

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If we do not, we will be dominated.

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So they saw the writing on the wall and got their act together.

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So the meja restoration of 1868 launched a frenzy of industrialization

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and militarization that lasted several decades, and they had a real

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developmental mindset that emerged.

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So there was a big push in state capacity.

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They sent teams of officials around the western world to investigate ways

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to organize a modern society such as tax system, post office railroad.

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Army, parliament, judiciary, and the like.

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And then they implemented the best models that they could at home.

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So Japan militarized so fast and effectively that in 18

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94, 18 95, its Navy defeated.

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China's and Aade later defeated rushes.

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And this sent a shockwave through Western governments because for the

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first time in the modern era, an Asian state defeated a European state.

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So Japan went on to become the first non-Western country to catch

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up with the West in broad measures of production structure, military

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strength, and mass living conditions.

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So a combination there of, of culture and also pressing need, having seen

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what had happened to China and not wanting to succumb to the same fate.

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After the war, Japan continued to be ruled by this developmental mindset,

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which had been sort of institutionalized during the maje, the mija restoration

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and in the buildup to the war.

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And a similar mindset was also institutionalized in Korea and Taiwan.

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Just read on here.

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So basically also the developmental mindset emerged from the combination of

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a few factors, lack of natural resources.

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So above all, land and energy, having actual a lot of natural resources is a,

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can be a bad thing, Joe, because one, you just get lazy in that you rely.

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The natural resources thinking of a country maybe in present world that

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has abundant natural resources and just is fairly lazy as a result and allows

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that industry to essentially dominate in the Yes, bringing the wealth.

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And you don't bother doing anything with your other manufacturing industries cuz

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you think, ah, why should we bother?

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We can just dig stuff up.

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Mm-hmm.

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, well, so Japan wasn't able to just dig stuff up.

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The other disadvantage of that is if you do have stuff that can

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be dug up, countries like America want to take possession of you

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and take the stuff from you.

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So if you don't have it, then they don't want to take it off you.

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Is a, is another sort of benefit of it.

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So it forces you to work on creating an industrial developmental capacity and

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Places like America are not tempted to invade you and, and take your minerals.

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So there's that aspect.

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They also had an abundance of people, I was

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gonna say the Americans prefer to invade, stick in a puppet regime.

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Yes.

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And then take the stuff.

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Indeed.

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So they had that in their favor.

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They had to reconstruct from the war, but they weren't starting from zero.

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They had actually built up a, a civilization.

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And so they just had to reconstruct.

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They knew how to do it.

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And they had lots of American money.

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Yes.

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And, and the well, and the re the other thing that they had in their

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favor was communist China and Russia on the doorstep and the American fear.

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That communist China and Russia would start to take over the world.

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So they wanted some friendly countries.

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There is a bowl walk against the yellow peril, if you like from

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communist China and from from Russia.

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American

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protector for many years after the war anyway, wasn't

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it?

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Yes.

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So we're gonna get into the detail of that.

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So there's a few advantages for Japan in that it was already industrial

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develop, developmental via culture.

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It was spooked by what happened to China.

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So it ramped up, it lost the war, but it had no natural resources.

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So it's forced to rely on its people.

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Had a large population that was well educated and it It had the benefit

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of having a nearby threat so that the US would want to bolster it as

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a counter to that communist threat.

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Right.

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Just turning briefly to Taiwan the native Taiwanese, most of whose ancestors

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had come from the mainland two or more centuries before and had experienced

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50 years of total separation from the mainland under Japanese rule, saw the

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chanka as foreigners and vice versa.

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So they were very Japanese by that point, the Taiwanese.

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And in South Korea they had a tightly disciplined military dictatorship.

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They used that external threat of communism North

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Korea as its justification.

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And the the ruler park, 1961.

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He had been educated in Japanese military academy, served in

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the Japanese army in Manura.

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He had studied the history of the Meja restoration and the role of the

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state in Japan's industrialization.

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And so he was a chief architect and driving force of career's development

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until his assassination in 1979.

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So that was from 61 to 79.

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He's an interesting, fun fact.

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Soon after he took power, he arrested leading businessmen and threatened

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them with jail for corruption unless they left for the United States

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and returned with export orders.

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That's one way of doing it, isn't it?

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I, I make a living as a sales rep.

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I tell you that, that that would really focus the mind on getting some orders.

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Mm-hmm.

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The dominant political philosophies of these countries emphasized

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order and nationalism more than liberty and free enterprise.

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So where the West likes to paint these countries as lovers of

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liberty and free enterprise.

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In fact, culturally that cra Yeah.

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Having known people who grew up in Singapore, that

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was very much an autocracy.

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Indeed.

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So before the second World War, you, United States had little presence in

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Northeast Asia, but after the war, containment of communism became a

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top priority and the US saw China and North Korea as a severe threat

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to the US sphere of influence.

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So the US poured in assistance.

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To its three Asian allies providing troops, economic advisors, political

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advisors, teachers accompanied by large financial transfers, essentially,

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dear listener, because of the threat of communist China and North Korea,

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the Americans pretty much did a textbook of of how to help countries

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out and make them successful.

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On the downside, they did send them their Mormons.

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Yes.

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Did they send them the Mormons or did the Mormons just sneak in?

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Oh, the Mormons went anyway.

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Yeah, it's like rats and sailing chip.

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They're just there anyway US advisors helped construct centralized top

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level agencies, the plan, the use of various scarce capital and helped

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construct an effective civil service.

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During the American occupation of Japan from 45 to 52, the Japanese government

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instituted the most restrictive foreign trade and foreign exchange control

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system ever devised by a major free nation and did it with American blessing.

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Okay, so in the seven years, immediately following the war, Japan had incredibly

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restrictive foreign trade protectionism.

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Exactly.

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The country's renaissance was helped much by the Korean War as well because

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Japan was the main source of American procurements for the Korean War.

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And the Japanese Prime Minister at the time later declared that the

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war was a gift of the gods because of the business that it generated.

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Incidentally, it was the Korean War that that basically emptied

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the US government's coffers.

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And sent it into deficit where it had to break with the gold standard

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because it was the money spent on the Korean War that finally broke

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the back of, of the American budget.

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But I digress.

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Okay.

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US government gave strong backing for land distribution in all three countries,

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meaning they helped with land reforms that enabled people to get a piece of

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land, ordinary people, and they provided support for industrialization by curbing

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the landed classes and strengthening peasant support for the state so that the

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peasant population, the rural population, felt good about what was happening

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and didn't wanna start a revolution.

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So they made it clear the US that they would not sustain this indefinitely and.

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So the main periods of intense US involvement were basically from sort of

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1948 to around 19 six, the mid 1960s.

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And so thanks to the threat of communist state expansion US wanted

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to protect its sphere of influence.

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It transferred huge resources to the Asian Japanese, Taiwan, Korean economies,

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and it allowed provide lots in.

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It allowed these countries to run sustained account deficits that would

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never allow Latin America to run.

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And also, It gave the aids and loans in a form that did not dilute national

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ownership of the industrial sector.

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So the Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese people were allowed to

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actually own these enterprises.

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And again, that's not what was allowed in the global south, where multinational

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country companies would come in and buy and own what had previously

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been owned by the local population.

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Right?

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And they also provided a market for all these goods that were being manufactured.

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So compare that to the Philippines, the US saw no existential threat.

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And they in terms of being worried about communists, they just relied

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on a counter insurgent strategy.

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They didn't try and do any land reform and didn't do anything like the

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assistance that it did in Northeast Asia.

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That's why a place like the Philippines got stuck.

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And basically, you know, supported the Filipino government in its efforts

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to provide agricultural goods and raw materials, but not industrial goods.

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And cuz it just wasn't worried about the threat, didn't need the

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Philippines to be a strong country.

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Let me just see here.

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I can skip through that part.

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I think I think I've already said that and.

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Basically goes on to say that the, the governments in these countries targeted

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specific sectors and protected industry and encouraged industry, provided

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support and kept tabs of what industry were doing and set goals for them and

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said, well, we'll give you this, but you have to achieve these certain goals.

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And so it was quite a target where they said, we want to develop a

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certain type of industry and U five comp companies, you are gonna do it.

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We're gonna keep an eye on you.

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You are going to create a little a As sort of an industry group, we're

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gonna provide from the government, a secretary for that group and

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we're gonna know what's going on.

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So really strong direction and monitoring by the government where they set targets

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and planned for these industries at the same time as allowing the individual

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companies some level of autonomy and market decision making, if you like.

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So really clever targeting is essentially like targeting with, not

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like the Russian version of a cost plan where they said exactly every

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step of the way what you have to do.

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It was a, a more sensible form of targeting and.

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Look, the article goes on, but I feel like I've been rabbiting on for long enough,

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and I'm gonna start repeating bits.

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The full notes are in the show notes that are given to the patrons.

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It does go on a fair bit on other things, but essentially that's it, Joe, is that

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the story of these countries was one of, of heavy state involvement, different

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inference by the Americans, and support by the Americans rather than crippling.

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And that's how they managed to break through.

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Interesting combination of factors.

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I particularly liked the factor of being unlucky enough to not have resources

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and unlucky enough to be next door to a communist threat, actually turned out

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to be lucky things in that it, it was.

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Stuff that helped trigger the United States to work hard

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to beef them up properly.

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Very interesting.

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Well, I wonder if how

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much Western Germany was the

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same.

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Mm, indeed.

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Indeed.

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mean, Japan and

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Germany, the debt was forgiven.

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Unlike the first World War, there was reparations indeed.

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Which they thought even if it didn't led into the poverty, that

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led to Hitler coming to power.

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Indeed.

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Yep.

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Which is why they

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forgave and also basically invested heavily to rebuild.

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Whereas Europe had to repay the debts, the repay the loans for equipment that

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they use to fight the ze World War.

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Mm.

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Now, next week, I think I'll be able to get onto talking about , the plaza record.

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So things went swimmingly well for Japan until the plaza record.

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And that was when the US said, hang on a minute, you guys are doing too good.

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And they changed some stuff.

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And so was this after

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the 1980s where they bought up half of America?

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Yeah, exactly.

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So next week we'll be the plaza record where the story is not so good for Japan,

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where in fact the US turns against them.

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So that'll be next week.

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IFVG Evergreen
This podcast is a collection of clips from the weekly long-form podcast called The Iron Fist and The Velvet Glove. If you enjoy the weekly podcast and want to listen to a curated selection of old content then this is the podcast for you
This podcast is a collection of clips from the weekly long-form podcast called The Iron Fist and The Velvet Glove. If you enjoy the weekly podcast and want to listen to a curated selection of old content then this is the podcast for you

About your host

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Trevor Bell

Trevor is a podcaster, blogger and social commentator who is worried about the direction of Australian society and has a special interest in challenging divisive influences such as religion and identity politics.

Trevor practised as a lawyer in his own firm until a diagnosis of Crohn’s disease prompted an early mid-life crisis and a change of career. Now that his children have grown up and left the nest he has found time to explore his interest in religions, politics and the transformations taking place in our society.